tion a competent force at the Junction was, therefore, not opposed to Ins own views.

As to the garrison of Washington, however, the case was entirely different McClellan had never assigned an adequate number of troops for this duty. He seems to have been satisfied with building the works which environed the city and suburbs, and which, beyond a question, if properly manned, made Washington capable of a successful defence against any army which the Confederacy possessed. But he nevur garrisoned these works fully. On January 13, I8<»a, Barnard, the Chief-of-engineers, wrote to McClellanls adjutant-general,[1] complaining in the strongest tenon of the neglect of these forts, twenty-eight of which were without garrisons, and in them 200 guns were mounted. " I look upon, the garrisoning of those works," wrote General Barnard, "that is, with artillery-men,—as under all circumstances indispennable, and an absolutely necessary preliminary to any offensive operations of the army. Such offensive operations, if made against distant points, may throw the defence of Washington against the bulk of£ the enemy's forces upon these works (assisted by reserves) ; or, *m* at Bull Run, it is in the range of pos-HibilitieH that a disaster in the field may paralyze our active army, or throw it back,

disorganized, to rally under the protection of these works." Nothing can, be sounder than this opinion of General Barnard.

The truth was that McClellan was intent only on* preparing a large army for the field. The equally important duty of providing an adequate and properly

* > 5 W. H., 698.